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Introduction 
Ethnic minorities in the highlands of Northern Thailand have long been accused of degrading 
the upper watersheds of the country’s major basins. During the past three decades, the 
impressive amount of agronomic research carried out to study ways to control soil erosion in 
the sloping highlands had limited success. The introduced standard “technological packages” 
were not adapted to local farming systems, and therefore were not widely adopted 
(Turkelboom and Trébuil 1998). In the meantime, environmental policies were reinforced. In 
the 1990s, the government further restricted highlanders’ access to farm land through the 
delimitation of reserved forest areas managed by the Royal Forestry Department, and the 
establishment of many new National Parks, Wildlife Sanctuaries, etc. (Hirsch 1997). This 
resulted in an increasing number of conflicts over land-use between local communities and 
state agencies. The limits of past research and policies in the field of soil and water 
conservation call for more integrated transdisciplinary and truly participatory approaches to 
better balance between agro-ecological and social aspects of collective management issues to 
be examined and mitigated (Sayer and Campbell 2003). 
Drawing the lessons from the numerous participatory watershed management projects 
conducted in the past, more and more authors argue that because of a lack of attention to the 
complex political contexts in which these projects were embedded, the less powerful 
stakeholders were often left behind (Wollenberg, Anderson et al. 2001). This issue has drawn 
a dividing line among scholars. Two main attitudes may be typified: a “dialogue” vision and a 
“critical” vision (Faysse 2006). According to the proponents of the dialogue vision, the main 
obstacles to fruitful coordination stem from a lack of genuine communication among 
stakeholders. Once this barrier is removed, it is possible to build a common vision, and to 
achieve consensus (Röling and Wagemakers 1998). On the contrary, proponents of critical 
vision argue that power relations need to be addressed first, otherwise there is a high risk that 
the participatory process deepens the existing social inequities (Edmunds and Wollenberg 
2001).  
The question we adress in this communication is: how far is a preliminary institutional 
analysis needed prior to the launch of a collaborative modelling process? This question is 
adressed drawing on a Companion Modelling (ComMod) experiment being conducted in Nan 
province, Northern Thailand, about a conflict between two Mien communities and a National 
Park. The objective of the ComMod approach is to stimulate collective learning and 
coordination among multiple stakeholders to solve a common problem of renewable resource 
management (Bousquet, Trébuil et al. 2005). Its principle is to develop simulation models 
integrating different stakeholders’ points of view on the problem at stake, and to use them to 
explore and discuss collectively various scenarios for the future. The objective of this 
communication is to demonstrate the importance of an initial institutional analysis prior to the 
ComMod process per se. We argue that this initial analysis of stakeholders social status, 
perceptions of the problem at stake, social relations and interactions is needed to: (i) identify 
the feasibility and the usefulness of a Commod process, (ii) identify the constraints towards 
equitable outcomes of the participatory process (who is likely to benefit?), and provide means 
to adapt the ComMod process to mitigate them, (iii) get a picture of the initial stakeholders’ 
perceptions and interactions to be used as a baseline to assess the effects of the ComMod 
process in terms of communication, collective learning and coordination mechanisms. 
After a presentation of the conceptual framework used to analyse the situation and its 
changes, and the ComMod process being implemented, we will present the results of the 
initial diagnosis and how they were used to tailor the on-going Commod process. The 
preliminary results of the ComMod process in terms of accommodation of multiple interests 
are also presented and discussed. In conclusion, the authors describe how they are used to 
define the next steps of the collective learning process. 
1 Conceptual framework of analysis & methodology 
1.1 Conceptual Framework of analysis 
To elaborate our conceptual framework of analysis of the initial situation and its changes 
along the ComMod process, we combined three main theories (figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of analysis used in Nan Province. 
 
First we used the agrarian systems theory to examine the main interacting socio-
economic and agro-ecological dynamics of the local system, and to identigy the different 
types of farming households having various agronomic & socio-economic constraints and 
related strategies (Trébuil and Dufumier 1993). 
Then we needed an institutionnal analysis to further elaborate on the political ecology 
of the water management problem. Institutions are here defined as a set of formal and 
informal rules that regulate the interactions among people, i.e. “the rules of the game” of a 
socio-political setting (Ostrom, Gardner et al. 1994). In the context of decentralization, these 
interactions and the power relations characterizing them were analyzed according to two 
dimensions: (i) horizontal interactions among people within the community, and (ii) vertical 
interactions between villagers and forest officers (National Park and Royal Forestry 
Department). At the intersection of both lays the key role of village leaders and 
representatives, in particular the village headman and the two elected members of the sub-
district (tambon) administrative organization (TAO) whose accountability is determinant for a 
democratic decentralization (Ribot 2001).  
Finally, as our ultimate purpose is to examine how the ComMod process will produce 
changes in the system, we also used elements of the learning theory focusing on changing 
perceptions and interactions (Leeuwis and Van Den Ban 2004).  
A set of qualitative indicators were analyzed before and along the ComMod process to 
monitor the effects of the process : (i) stakeholders’ perception of the issue at stake (based on 
their interest & their knowledge), (ii) their perception of other stakeholders, (iii) their 
interactions with  other stakeholders, and (v) their perception of future possible scenarios to 
mitigate the problem at stake. 
1.2 The Companion Modelling process 
ComMod is a continuous and iterative modelling process alternating field and laboratory 
activities in a cyclical way, its main successive phases being as follows: (i) Characterization 
of the problem, (ii) Modelling, i.e converting knowledge into a formal tool to be used as a 
simulator; and (iii) Simulations to explore various scenarios of solutions (Bousquet, Trébuil et 
al. 2005).  
Two kinds of simulation tools are used: Agent-Based Models (ABM) and RolePlaying Games 
(RPG). According to Duke (1974), RPG is an excellent mode of communication  to convey 
complexity as it allows multiple stakeholders to interactively examine the complex systems 
they are part of. Players can test alternative scenarios, but quickly this becomes costly and 
very time consuming. To remove this constraint, it is possible to build a simple computerized 
ABM, very similar to the RPG in its features and rules, which is far more time-efficient to 
simulate scenarios (Barreteau, Bousquet et al. 2001). Moreover, the RPG allows the players to 
understand the ABM model, to validate and criticize it, and, later on to easily follow ABM 
simulations. 
The main steps of the ComMod process implemented so far are as follows (figure 2): 
1. Initial diagnosis analysis to identify the key problem of ressource management, the 
main stakeholders, and the constraints towards an equitable outcome of the process, 
and to get a picture of the stakeholders’ initial perceptions and interactions related to 
the identified problem (the National Park issue). 
2. Conception of a Role-Playing Game  to help stakeholders reflect collectively upon the 
National Park issue. 
3. First participatory workshop with the villagers: 
a. Day 1: gaming sessions and discussions, 
b. Day 2: individual interviews to better understand players’ behaviour, to assess 
the model of the game, and its learning effects. 
4. Results of the gaming sessions explained to the National Park officers by using an 
Agent-Based Model simulating the game. 
5. Continuous monitoring of the effects of the process through individual interviews. 
Only the preliminary steps of a first cycle were implemented so far, and the monitoring of the 
effects of the process are being used to define next steps of this adaptive experiment. We 
might need to redefine the problem, to implicate different stakeholders and to adapt the 
methodology to mitigate new constraints to equity which emerged during the first cycle.    
 
 Figure 2. Main steps of the ComMod process implemented in Nan Province.  
2 Results & discussion 
2.1 Initial agrarian and institutional context in two Mien villages 
2.1.1 History of local agrarian system 
 
Map 1. Land-use in Nan province and location of the two studied villages. 
 
Ban Nam Ki and Ban Nam Paeng are two villages belonging to Mien ethnic minority, located 
in Thawangpha district, Nan province, Northern Thailand (map 1). These two villages’ history 
is characterized by a succession of state interventions and subsequent adaptations of villagers’ 
livelihoods. Until the 1970s, they were living at high elevation, among itinerant clans 
practising shifting agriculture based on the cultivation of maize, upland rice and opium poppy, 
and associated to swine rearing. In the late 1970s the government declared their territory as a 
“pink” area at risk of falling into the hands of the communist rebellion and forced them to 
settle in sedentary villages located in lower areas. At the same time, logging companies were 
opening new roads and the government was promoting cash cropping to replace opium poppy 
cultivation. These changes initiated the emergence of a new agrarian system dominated by 
maize and cotton as main cash crops. Farmers practiced extensive shifting cultivation that, 
together with logging and accidental forest fires, led to deforestation. Then, as a villager said: 
“after the middlemen, we saw forest officers coming to the village”. In the 1990s, the 
headwaters conservation policy led to the establishment of the Nam Haen Watershed Unit as a 
local office of the Royal Forestry Department (RFD). Beside a replantation program, it 
delimited farm and forest land in each village to prevent further encroachment. As villagers 
lost most of their fallow areas, they had to shift to permanent cultivation. The subsequent 
higher need for chemical inputs increased the production costs and farmers’ vulnerability to 
fluctuating market prices. In spite of the introduction of perennial crops such as lychee, farm 
incomes are still often insufficient to meet families’ basic needs. Indebtedness is widespread 
and more and more villagers have to find complementary off-farm employment. 
Unlike many other places across north Thailand, there was no open conflict between 
villagers and the RFD thanks to the efforts made by the local officers to establish a dialogue 
with villagers. They encouraged villagers to set up community forests with agreed-upon rules 
at the village level. Most of the time they allowed them to collect Non Timber Forest Products 
(NTFP) in reserved forest areas, and they employed them to participate in forestry activities 
(fire-breaks, replantation plots, fire surveillance etc.). 
2.1.2 Characterization of the main types of farming households 
In the meanwhile, the enforcement of environmental policies and the integration of agriculture 
into the market economy accelerated the process of differentiation among farming 
households. In the current agrarian system, one can identify three main types of farming 
households. Type A are very precarious landless or near landless households highly 
dependant on NTFP such as Arenga palm fruits for cash income, and various plants and 
animals for self-consumption. These forest products and the low daily wages earned in the 
village or in town are essential to their survival (figure 3a). Type B farming households have 
sufficient land and funding to earn their main income from agriculture. However, NTFP are 
an important complementary source of cash to face irregular farm incomes (figure 3b). Type 
C farming households have enough capital to invest in a rather profitable off-arm activity like 
selling soymilk on markets, which in return allows them to invest in large irrigated lychee 
plantations (figure 3c). 
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Figure 3a. Diagram illustrating the functionning of type A farming households in two Mien 
villages, Nan Province, 2006. 
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Figure 3b. Diagram illustrating the functionning of type B faming households in two Mien 
villages, Nan province, 2006. 
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Figure 3c. Diagram illustrating the functionning of type C faming households in two Mien 
villages, Nan Province, 2006 
2.1.3 The National Park issue: main stakeholders’ perceptions and interactions 
The Nantaburi National Park started to settle in 1996 and should be officially declared in 
2007. Up to now, there are still neither clear boundaries, nor clear resource management rules 
yet, in particular regarding rights to gather NTFPs. The two studied villages are located closed 
to the park boundary and some of their farm land and the forest areas in which they gather 
Arenga fruits and other NTFPs risk to be located inside the park. According to the Thai law, 
no human activity is allowed inside the park, but the chief officer of the National Park, who 
did not look at the NTFPs issue so far said that “things will have to be discussed again when 
the National Park will be officially declared”. 
Stakeholders can be categorised according to their relative influence and importance: 
importance refers to those whose needs and interests are the priorities in the issue at stake 
while influence refers to the power certain stakeholders have over the  outcome of this issue 
(Grimble and Wellard 1997). Figure 4 displays the relative inluence and importance of the 
primary and secondary stakeholders involved in the settlement of the Nanthaburi National 
Park.   
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Figure 4. Matrix of stakeholders’ relative influence and importance in the National Park issue. 
 
The following section describes the various perceptions and interactions among the 
primary stakeholders. The National Park would like to enforce the law, but is afraid of 
possible violent reactions from the villagers. Its chief officer has many prejudices against 
ethnic minorities, seeing them as forest destroyers “who always want more, and with whome 
it is impossible to discuss because they don’t understand anything”. He had no dialogue with 
villagers so far, except with the village headman in Ban Nam Paeng. He has therefore very 
limited knowledge of the villagers current situations. But there are disagreements within the 
institution: a staff of the National Park in charge of public relations said that according to her, 
“the main problem came from the chief who doesn’t want to speak face to face to villagers”.  
RFD officers are in a go-between position. Being a state agency they need to 
collaborate with the National Park, but unlike the National Park, they tolerate the presence of 
villagers in the forests. They established good relationships with them in the past, agreed on 
co-management rules, and they don’t want to see the new National Park spoiling the results of 
all these past efforts. One can distinguish the RFD local officer from the community 
coordinators, the second ones having less power but feeling more concern by the relationships 
they established with the villagers.  
On the villagers’ side, there is a diversity of levels of informations and interests linked 
to the diversity of farming households social status and strategies. Among the type A farming 
households, as their participation in local politics is very limited, their level of information is 
very low. Their perceptions of the situation are mainly based on fear and assumptions, and not 
on tangible information, despite they are the ones with the highest interests in this issue. They 
indeed risk to loose the rights to collect NTFP which are necessary to their survival, such as 
bamboo shoots and rattan shoots for self-consumption, dead wood for firewood, and Arenga 
for cash. In their eyes, all villagers are in the same situation.   
Type B farming households are slightly more informed about the National Park 
because they have more interactions with other villagers and assist more frequently to the 
meetings. They mainly feel concerned by the risk to loose some farm land. As for the forest 
products, it is not their main interest and they generally hardly believe that there is risk to 
loose the right to collect them as RFD officers allowed them to collected them in the past. 
Type C farmers usually keep more or less informed about the National Park related 
events, although they have no personnal interests in this issue. Among type B and C farmers, 
some think other villagers will not face much difficulties with the National Park 
establishment, while some other realize that the villagers who are mainly living from forest 
products will have problems to survive and risk to protest violently.   
As far as village representatives are concerned, the institutional context differs 
between the two villages. In Ban Nam Paeng, the village headman (a well-off type C farmer) 
is very aware of the situation and already met with the National Park to negotiate the village 
farm land boundary so that all the farming households could keep their farm land. He 
considers that the problems with the National Park are solved and doesn’t feel concerned by 
the problem of access to NTFP. In Ban Nam Ki, the young and recently-elected village 
headman (a type B farmer) is not aware at all of the situation as he had hardly ever heard 
about the National Park when we first met him. The ones who are the most aware of the 
situation are two well-off type C farmers: a TAO representative and an old informal 
environmentalist leader. They have no personnal economic interest in this issue but they want 
to retain their community forest and feel betrayed by government institutions which helped 
them to establish it in the past and now want to take it back.  
This institutional analysis conducted with the primary stakeholders revealed an 
impressive diversity of perceptions reflecting the multiple interests at stake, the lack of clarity 
of the situation, and the poor communication among stakeholders. A ComMod process 
stimulating communication and collective learning among stakeholders was considered 
potentially useful to accompany the collective decision-making process related to the 
establishment of the National Park. This institutional analysis also revealed that such a 
ComMod process was feasible, but that there would be constraints towards an equitable 
outcome of the process.  
2.1.4 Identification of the main constraints towards an equitable process 
We identified five main constraints:   
(1) Unequal access to information about the National Park establishment, with an 
important lack of information among those who are the most direcltly concerned by its 
consequences (type A villagers), 
(2) High diversity of ability to participate in collective decision-making processes among 
the villagers, with a particularly low ability among type A farmers (low level of 
participation in the village meetings, low communication skills, few interactions with 
the village representatives),    
(3) High diversity of interests related to the National Park among the villagers,  
(4) Village leaders and representatives belonging to a local elite and who are not 
accountable for the village population as a whole (little concern for ressource-poor 
villagers’ interests), 
(5) Village leaders and representatives not always aware of the role they could play in the 
negociation with the National Park, and therefore not prepared for it, especially in Ban 
Nam Ki), 
(6) Highly “top-down minded” National Park officers (prejudices against ethnic 
minorities, not prone to dialogue). 
2.2 The ComMod process in action   
2.2.1 Specific adaptations of the ComMod process to mitigate the constraints towards an 
equitable process 
To answer to constraints 1 and 5, one of the objectives of the ComMod process was to 
increase villagers’ awareness of the National Park issue: 
- Choice of scenarios to be played in the game: a first gaming session was played 
according to the current situation in the village, i.e. without National Park, and a 
second one was played to simulate a scenario with the National Park, to increase 
villagers’ awareness about it, and to start make them think and discuss together 
about how they could prepare to this.   
Answers to constraint 2 aimed at ensuring that all stakeholders understood the ComMod 
process and felt free to express themselves at some moment: 
- Choice of tools: the game is more easy and attractive to follow than formal dicussions, 
in particular for those with low communication skills, 
- Choice of participants: all groups of interests were represented in the game, and no 
group was represented by single or intimidated players, 
- Individual interviews and small homogeneous discussions were conducted beside 
plenary sessions to allow the less powerfull villagers to express themselves not in the 
presence of the powerful ones. 
Answers to constraint 3 and 4 aimed at stimulating exchanges of perceptions about the 
National Park issue among villagers:  
- Game conceived to highlight differences among farming households, 
- Use of a “card ranking technique” : all raised problems related to the establishment of 
the National Park were drawn on small cards which  were displayed on a board, and 
the participants were invited to indicate with post-it of different colors their own rank 
of importance of the problems. This “card ranking technique” was used to support the 
discussions to underline the diversity of interests existing in the community without 
trying to reach consensus. 
To answer to constraints 5 and 6, the ComMod process was organized to go step by step 
towards dialogue and mutual understanding between the National Park and the communities: 
- First, a participatory workshop was conducted with villagers to prepare them to a 
negociation with the National Park, i.e. to increase their awareness about the 
potential problems and to make them discuss together about collective solutions in 
spite of their differences.  
- Second, a meeting with  the National Park officers to be transparent and inform 
them about the results of our activities, to sensitize them about the ComMod 
approach, to make them learn about villagers’ situations, and to allow them to 
discuss together (among forest officers) about these issues.  
- Next step (not implemented yet) should be a gaming session with both villagers and 
National Park officers.   
2.2.2 Description of the Role-Playing Game 
The objectives of this Role-Playing Game were twofolds: to better understand the situation, 
and to accompany a collective decision-making process related to the National Park.   
1. To better understand the situation  
a. to confront our understanding of the agrarian situation to the villagers’ 
perceptions (through their assessment of the game), 
b. to better understand mechanisms of villagers’ collective decision-making 
processes (interactions among villagers about land and forest ressources, 
interactions during a collective decision-making process, power relations, role 
of village representatives), 
c. to better understand villagers’ problems and preoccupations and to adapt the 
ComMod process accordingly (to check whether National Park is a relevant 
problem or not, to precise or redefine the problem). 
2. To accompany a collective decision-making process  
a. to increase villagers awareness of the National Park issue,  
b. to make them exchange their views on this issue to prepare themselves to an 
eventual negotiation with the National Park.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 5. The gaming board used in the village of Ban Nam Ki, Nan Province, June 2006.  
 
Figure 5 presents the spatial interface of the game, i.e. the gaming board, and box 1 the main 
principles of this game. As for the ecological dynamics, we used simple rules of regeneration 
of forest products (figure 6). Concerning Arenga, as villagers only collect the fruits without 
cutting the palm (as they did in the past), gathering has no effect on the regeneration dynamic. 
Concerning other NTFPs, as bamboo shoots and rattan shoots are the main ones, there is a 
risk of decrease in ressource in case of over-harversting. 
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Box 1. Main principles of the Role Playing Game in the ComMod experiment conducted in 
two Mien villages, Nan Province, June 2006. 
 
 
Figure 6. Rules of regeneration of forest products (Arenga fruits and other NTFP) in the Role-
Playing Game conducted in two Mien villages, Nan Province, June 2006. 
 
Two versions of this Role-Playing Game were conducted in the two villages. The 
principles remained the same, only the spatial interface and the calibration differed. The main 
difference was the location of the community forest. In Ban Nam Ki, the community forest in 
which villagers collect Arenga and other NTFP risks to be inside the National Park. In Ban 
Nam Paeng, the forest area where villagers collect Arenga is also inside the National Park, but 
they also have a community forest in which they gather other NTFP which will not be inside 
the National Park.   
2.2.3 What happened during the gaming sessions and discussions?  
The gaming sessions and collective discussions were organized as follows:  
(i) Scenario corresponding to the current situation (no National Park yet), 
The 12 participating villagers play the role of farming households managing their farms to meet 
their family basic needs. They are given various amounts of land ressources, family labours and 
financial means according to the actual farming conditions of the three main socio-economic types 
of farming households in the village (types A, B and C for poor, medium and well-off farms 
respectively). They belong to the same socio-economic category in the game and in reality. 
National Park officers were not invited to this game but their presence was indicated by a factice 
stakeholder made of paper. Each year, the players successively: 
• decide whether to send family labour work in town (low wage employment or soymilk seller) 
• Individually assign a given crop to each of their fields after paying for input costs (and taking 
into account the labour constraint), 
• All together, gather Arenga and other forest products for self consumption (no imposed rule, 
players decided themselves the rules of access to ressources) 
• Harvest their crops and go to the market desk to sell their products and pay for family 
expenses, 
• If family basic needs are met, draw an “exceptionnal expense card” (wedding, fridge, TV, etc.) 
 
Two scenarios were played, with and without National Park. In the second one, a fictive National 
Park boundary was drawn and farming and gathering activities were forbidden inside the area. 
(ii) Short debriefing to assess collectively the game, 
(iii) Scenario “what if the National Park came and strictly applied the law without any 
negociation”, 
(iv) Debriefing about this scenario (problems encountered and possible solutions): sub-
group discussions among farmers belonging to the same socio-economic type, 
followed by a plenary session discussion using the card ranking technique. 
Individual interviews with particpants were conducted successively in the two 
villages two days after each Role Playing Game. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Players’ incomes from forest ressources and off-farm activities during the gaming 
sessions, scenarios with and without the National Park, in Ban Nam Ki and Ban Nam Paeng, 
Nan Province, June 2006. 
 
In the two villages, the players were very fast at ease with the rules of the game, and the 
general atmosphere playful. Most of the players chose the same crops and off-farm activities 
like in reality, according to their socio-economic type. But some players also tested new 
strategies to improve themselves or by curiosity. Concerning the collect of NTFP, no rule was 
imposed by the facilitating team, the players had to decide them themselves. In Ban Nam Ki, 
some players tried to initiate discussion to set up a collective gathering strategy, but before 
they have time to finish, all the players rush to gather the forest products. So the rule was 
“every one for himself”, and the ressources in products ofther than Arenga (bamboo shoots, 
rattan shoots, etc.) decreased year after year because of over-harvesting. In Ban Nam Paeng, 
the villagers agreed on a common rule stipulating not to collect more than two “post-it” per 
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player. In the two villages, when the National Park established, all type A and most of type B 
players could not meet they family basic needs any more because of a sharp decrease in their 
forest incomes (figure 7). All indebted players decided to send one labour working in town in 
low wage employement. Type C players were hardly not affected by the National Park. In 
Ban Nam Paeng, the players decided to break the rule the second year, whereas in Ban Nam 
Ki, no one did because a TAO representative said “we cannot steal, we have to negociate”.  
During the small group discussions, farmers belonging to the same socio-economic 
category could discuss together about encountered problems and possible solutions. The 
suggestions made falled into three themes: the need to negociate with the National Park to 
keep the right to collect forest products in a sustainable way, the need to reflect upon and 
agree on such sustainable ways to collect forest products, and the need to ask for 
compensations in case the National Park did not agree to let them gather forest products.  
During the plenary session discussions, the card ranking techniques allowed to highlight 
differences of interests among villagers, but the discussions were particularly tense and lively 
in Ban Nam Ki when discussing about the relative importance of Arenga and other NTFPs, 
revealing sharp differences of interests and tensions between the three hamlets of this village. 
First settlers belong the central hamlet. They have access to more Arenga palms than other 
hamlets, so their representatives claim the prioritary importance of Arenga, while other 
hamlets value more other NTFPs. There were also tensions within each hamlet: for example, 
some type A farmers from this central hamlet who first claimed the prioritary importance of 
forest products for subsistance did not dare anymore express their view in the presence of 
their representatives.   
2.2.4 Use of computer simulation for a restitution to the National Park 
During the individual interviews conducted after the game, all the participants said we should 
show to the National Park the results of the gaming sessions, so that the officers would know 
better about villagers’ livelihoods and the problems they would face if the rules were strictly 
applied. An agent-based model entirely similar to the game was built to “replay” the gaming 
sessions in the two villages. The officers of the National Park and the Royal Forestry 
Department who were invited to the meeting could easily follow the simulations, which was a 
simple and lively way to explain them what happened. They said it allowed them to better 
understand villagers’ circumstances, but when asked whether they would join a meeting with 
villagers, the chief officer of the National Park was still reluctant. However, a few days later, 
the same man decided to organize a meeting with all villagers in Ban Nam Ki. From what 
villagers told us, this meeting was very tense, in a climate of reciprocal mistrust, but both 
parties finally started to agree on compromises. If there is an effect of the ComMod process in 
the decision of the chief officer to finally go and discuss with villagers, it is probably related 
to the presence of the officers of the Royal Forestry Departement to the meeting as they value 
dialogue with villagers.               
2.3 Preliminary assessment of the effects of the ComMod process 
2.3.1 What did researchers learn?  
First, we could validate our general understanding of the situation. The participants found 
the game very realistic, highlighting the realism of features such as the differences of wealth 
among villagers, the riskiness of agricultural activities, the different regeneration dynamics of 
Arenga and other NTFP, etc.  
Second, we could improve our understanding of the mechanisms of collective decision 
making processes in the villages. The game is good way to reveals individual and collective 
behaviours which are not easy to catch with classical interviews, due to the differences in the 
way people say they behave and the way the actually behave. As seen in the previous section, 
the game revealed important tensions between the three hamlets in Ban Nam Ki, what is a key 
point as they will have to find an agreement at the village level when negociating with the 
National Park. The game also revealed that in spite of community rules which were 
established in the past about ways to gather forest products, as these rules faded away year 
after year, coordination among them was not self-evident and needs to be reinforced. We 
could also better understand key elements related to power relations and the role of village 
leaders: the tensions and the lack of communication among the various representatives (heads 
of the powerfull clans), the paternalistic influence of representatives over the villagers 
belonging to their clan, the lack of legitimacy of informal old leaders vis-à-vis the new 
generation, and the lack of self confidence of most villagers in their ability to participate to 
local politics (in particular the women). 
2.3.2 What did participants learn? 
Individual interviews revealed that the game increased significantly the players’ awareness of 
the National Park issue. They realized what might be the consequences of its establishment 
for their livelihoods. And more importantly, it introduced a feeling of urgency among them to 
adapt to this new situation, and to prepare themselves to an eventual negociation with the 
National Park. It also increased their feeling of interdependency: most of them said they 
realized they had to prepare themselves collectively, and they had indeed more formal and 
informal discussions about it after the game. It also increased some players awareness’ of the 
need to reinforce collective rules for sustainable use of forest ressources. Moreover, the game 
allowed to exchange their views on the situation: some participants said the game made them 
realize the diversity of interests existing within the community, and therefore the necessity to 
coordinate. Two village representatives in Ban Nam Ki saw the game as as useful tool “to 
create unity in the village, to increase villagers’ sens of belonging to the community”. The 
game was also seen by some participants as a way to increase leaders’ accountabilty: “The 
village headman and the TAO representatives should join every game because they have to 
know how villagers think, what they want.” said a female participant. In Ban Nam Ki, for 
example, the day after the game, the village headman (who did not feel concern about the 
National Park issue before the game) asked many villagers about their own opinion 
concerning the main problems they would face with the National Park.  
If several suggestions of solutions were made by the participants, no agreement 
concerning these solutions was achieved during this first workshop. The facilitating team did 
not insist to make them reach any consensus as we considered it was necessary for the 
participants to know more about the situation and to understand each other’ differences first. 
Moreover, key informations related to the National Park’ intentions were obviously missing. 
However the workshop facilitated steps to prepare villagers to the coming negociations with 
the National Park. During the workshop, they agreed on the need to talk among themselves 
first, to identify some representatives, and to call if needed key stakeholders at higher levels 
of organization to support them.  
Conclusion & perspectives 
This communication illustrated the usefulness to conduct an initial diagnosis prior to any 
participatory process. This initial analysis of the various stakeholders’ perceptions and 
interactions was useful to identify the feasibility and the usefulness of a Commod process, as 
well as the constraints towards an equitable outcome of such a process. This allowed us to 
adapt the ComMod methodology accordingly and to mitigate them to a certain extent. 
Morover, such a picture of the initial stakeholders’ perceptions and interactions is necessary 
to assess the effects of the participatory process in terms of communication, collective 
learning and coordination mechanisms. However, accommodation of multiple interests is a 
long and enduring process, and it is not sufficient to focus one’s attention to power 
heterogeneities in the initial socio-political context, this effort should be maintained all along 
the process. A continuous and critical monitoring of the effects of the on-going process and its 
constant adaptation to mitigate the identified constraints towards equity are required.  
In this ComMod process, four constraints emerged during the first steps. First, in Ban 
Nam Ki, two participants did not understand well who we were and what was the purpose of 
the game, and felt slightly worried and suspicious. This is because they were not interviewed 
before (they replaced two missing participants), and they did not understand well Thai 
language. To adapt to this situation, greater efforts should be made to re-build the missing 
trust relationship, and in all the coming meetings, there should be a constant translation Thai-
Mien. Second, many participants highlighted that a main limit of the game was the small 
number of players, as discussions concerned all villagers. We are planning to organize a 
meeting with all villagers using the agent-based model replaying the gaming sessions to 
mitigate this problem anf to create a forum of discussions at the village level. Third, the 
conflicts betwen the three hamlets and between the various representatives belonging to 
different powerfull clans is a major constraint for the process. As two representatives of this 
village said, the process itself might help to mitigate it as the game could help increase the 
unity in the village. Forth, the chief of the National Park said he could not make any formal 
agreement with villagers allowing them to gather forest products as these decisions are taken 
at the government level. Beside the illustration of the limits of decentralization in Thailand, 
this risks to put discussions to a standstill while leaving villagers in a very insecure situation. 
We will then have to adjust the objectives of the ComMod process: to stimulate 
communication, collective learning and mutual understanding to favour the emergence of co-
management rules in which both the National Park and the communities find their place and 
have a role to play. At the local level, this might help to perpetuate unformal agreements, and 
at a higher level, it might serve as an (other) example illustrating the need to change the 
existing regulations towards a legal recognition of a plurality of institutions in the 
management of natural ressources. The Community Forestry Bill which has been debated in 
the Thai parliament for more than ten years is an attempt to make a step in this direction.    
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